


25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010042-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010042-2

Top Secret



STAFF NOTES:

Middle East Africa South Asia

State Department review completed

NSA review completed

Top Secret

25X1

134

March 3, 1975

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010042-2

Approved For Release 2005/04/27 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400010042-2

MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA


25X1

CONTENTS

Israel: Severe Water Problem Likely to Persist	1
Tanzania: Undecided about Policy toward Ethiopia	4
Kenya: Bombing Results in Heavy Casualties . .	6

Mar 3, 1975

25X1


Israel*Severe Water Problem Likely to Persist*

Israel has always had a severe water problem and, as the population grows and industry and agriculture develop, the problem is likely to persist. It could become increasingly important in future Israeli negotiations with Syria and Jordan.

The southern half of the country is desert or semidesert, and the more favored land in the north is subject to recurring drought. Over the years, drought occurs on an average of one year in every four; drought years may, however, occur consecutively, as was the case between 1958 and 1963. Whenever a drought comes, a heavy burden is placed on Israel's water supply.

In 1974, rainfall in Israel was close to normal, and slightly over 1.4 billion cubic meters of water was available. However, an estimated 1.6 billion cubic meters was used. The additional water had to come from subterranean sources that Israel tries to conserve. Normally, the National Water Carrier, an integrated supply system of over 70 miles of pipelines and canals, takes Jordan River water from Lake Tiberias and distributes it to the coastal areas and the Negev Desert.

Israel's concern over water resources is likely to be reflected in Tel Aviv's negotiating position in peace talks with Syria. Foreign Minister Allon spelled out this concern last year when he said that the Golan Heights are not only of military importance to Israel, but are required to ensure the country's water supply. The upper Baniyas River, which supplies about one fourth of the water in the Jordan River, is wholly within Israeli-occupied Golan.

About 30 percent of Israel's annual water requirement is met by waters from the Jordan. The rest of

(Continued)

Mar 3, 1975

1

the requirement is met by wells and springs, roughly 55 percent, and surface runoff catchment and sewage reclamation, about 15 percent.

Lake Tiberias is the principal storage reservoir for the water carrier, but its usefulness is limited by high salinity rising from mineral springs on the lake bottom. Only the top three meters of water can be used in the national system. Salinity would increase abruptly if the lake's surface were to drop below the critical point, but the Israelis have so far not permitted this to happen. Increased amounts of sewage, fertilizers, and other pollutants are aggravating the problem of Tiberias water quality as the population increases in the lake region.

Water shortages in Israel are made up by pumping from the underground sources that feed wells and springs in the country. Israel counts on rainy years ahead to recharge this supply. In places along the coast, underground waters have been depleted to a point where sea water is intruding. Israel tries to recharge these coastal subterranean sources by diverting water from the National Water Carrier into the ground, but the amount of water from the carrier has usually been less than the amount pumped out, and the deficit has accumulated.

Recent water figures show the country has overdrawn its groundwater reserves by about 400 million cubic meters. If rainfall is not above normal for the next five years the overdraft is expected to reach 850 million cubic meters, and if dry years occur it will go significantly higher.

Water for agriculture has been rationed for several years, and reductions in urban water consumption are being discussed. Israel has tried new conservation techniques that range from the successful use of brackish water for irrigating certain crops to an underground irrigation process that carries water directly to the roots of individual plants.

(Continued)

Mar 3, 1975

2

[REDACTED]

The Israelis have developed a plan that may yield an extra 360 million cubic meters of fresh water annually for the next five years. The plan, which will cost over \$213 million, involves:

- Building rain catchment basins to store about 50 million cubic meters annually.
- Constructing a second dam south of Lake Tiberias to catch and store fresh water over-flow from rainy periods.
- Recovering an additional 160 million cubic meters per year by treating sewage.
- Desalination of water from brackish sources in the south.
- Drilling many wells.

The country has four main desalination plants and five pilot desalination projects in operation at this time. The combined daily production is only about 13,245 cubic meters of water, all of it consumed near the plants. Israeli officials, however, continue to debate the feasibility of mounting a full-scale program to desalt sea and brackish water.

The cost of such an undertaking has, in the past, discouraged the Israelis, but a feeling is growing that a major desalination effort cannot be postponed much longer, whatever the cost. In 1973, it cost the Israelis 22 cents per cubic meter for desalted water and 8 cents per cubic meter for carrier water. Desalted water will probably continue to be too costly to become a major source of supply.

The outlook is not favorable. There are no major additional sources of water available to Israel. Droughts will occur, and the carefully conserved subterranean sources will be further depleted as population increases and industrial and agricultural development continues. Technology and ingenuity will provide short-range remedies, but Israel's water resources will remain very limited.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Mar 3, 1975

3

Tanzania*Undecided about Policy toward Ethiopia*

Tanzania has generally followed the Organization of African Unity policy of supporting the territorial integrity of member states. Dar es Salaam now, however, is reviewing its policy toward Ethiopia in the wake of renewed fighting between Eritrean separatists and government forces.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Tanzania and other OAU states have generally opposed claims by irredentists, dissident minorities, and separatists. Tanzania and OAU members have favored the status quo in black Africa as a defensive measure. They hoped adherence to the OAU resolution would help prevent the breakup of many fragile new states composed of disparate ethnic groups.

Tanzania and other OAU countries looked the other way when tribal warfare erupted in Burundi in 1972, and have given no encouragement to Somalia's efforts to enlist African support for its efforts to annex Ethiopian and Kenyan territory populated by ethnic Somalis. Tanzania departed from the OAU policy when it extended formal diplomatic recognition to the Biafran breakaway state in 1968, but it was joined by only three other OAU members.

Tanzania's leaders were shocked by the Ethiopia regime's execution in November of General Aman and 60 leading figures in the former regime. Nonetheless, Dar es Salaam thus far has consistently supported

(Continued)

Mar 3, 1975

4

25X1

the ruling military council in Addis Ababa. At the end of October--three months before the outbreak of the current fighting in Eritrea--the Tanzanian foreign minister told the US ambassador that he favored US military assistance for Ethiopia, a statement in sharp contrast to past Tanzanian rhetoric deploring the US military role in the region. Last month the government-dominated press in Tanzania urged the Addis Ababa government to redress the grievances of the Eritreans, but at the same time endorsed the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and deplored secessionist demands as instigated by enemies of Africa.

Tanzania's apparently wavering attitude toward the Addis Ababa government may stem in part from Dar es Salaam's desire to avoid alienating the Arabs that support the Eritrean insurgents. Tanzania, a poor country, is feeling the pinch of the high cost of imported oil and other goods and does not want to risk offending any potential Arab aid donors.



25X1

Mar 3, 1975

5

Kenya

Bombing Results in Heavy Casualties

Twenty seven people were killed and at least 35 seriously injured when a bomb exploded on a crowded Nairobi bus on March 1. This was the third bombing in the city in less than ten days; the first two explosions caused no loss of life.

This type of violence is unusual for Kenya. Thus far the authorities appear unable to identify the perpetrators or to determine if the bombings were politically motivated. Shortly after the first two bombings, someone claiming membership in a previously unknown group, the Poor People's Liberation Organization, told a local newspaper his group was responsible for the explosions.

There are more than enough social issues in Kenya to fuel discontent. Many are dissatisfied with tribal favoritism in jobs and government benefits, inequitable land distribution, and the visible contrast in living standards between the favored few and the impoverished majority. Some of the 9,000 university students in Nairobi are resentful over tight government control over the universities, which had been closed for several months last year because of student protests.

The bombings appear to have stimulated many false telephone reports of bombs being placed in hotels and public places. There have also been some extortion attempts; Nairobi has its share of local underworld types, as well as foreigners living by their wits.

25X1

Mar 3, 1975

6